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I. Analysis
1. The scope of the problem
Illicit small arms availability has become a
global threat to the sovereignty of states at
macro- and micro levels. The massive stock
of small arms accumulated during the Cold
War has turned into a dangerous time bomb
which the international community so far
appears incapable of controlling. State bor-
ders provide little protection from its effects.
The stocking of small arms during the Cold
War greatly exceeded military requirements.
Among the reasons being that military plan-
ning was shrouded in secrecy and parlia-
mentary supervision generally weak and that
continuous demand irrespective of realistic
requirements tended to enhance the prestige
of the armed forces. Three observations sup-
port this contention. When the National Peo-
ple’s Army of the GDR was taken over by the
Federal Armed Forces of the FRG in the pro-
cess unification, it came as a big shock that
the military stores contained in many catego-
ries of arms and ammunition several times
the volumes western intelligence had esti-
mated before the end of the Cold War. Sec-
ondly, it was estimated that the number of
automatic guns looted in Albania when the
pyramid schemes collapsed in 1996
amounted to ten or more pieces for every Al-
banian soldier. Finally, even before the end of
the Cold War the American CIA was able to
acquire more or less secretly more than one
million Russian Kalashnikovs plus ammuni-
tion to feed the supply logistics of the muja-
hedin in Afghanistan and their Pakistani in-
termediaries. There were many nations at
hand willing to sell large quantities of Ka-
lashnikovs. Apparently they could afford
these sales without endangering their na-
tional security, as their arsenals were bulging
with surplus at the time.
The full impact of the unbound small arms
arsenals will only be felt in the years to come
because of the enormous magnitude of the
volumes circulating already beyond effective
controls. The heritage of the lavish American
supply to the mujahedin in Afghanistan is
but one element of the masses of small arms
floating freely across black market networks
(Kartha 1999). In decaying state structures of
transition countries corrupt state agents have
been opening the floodgates to supply sol-
vent customers on the black market out of the
backdoors of the arsenals. Therefore, present
levels of disturbances, violence and system-
atic violations of human rights are but the
harbinger of emerging societal fragmentation
in ever wider parts of the world enabled and
reinforced by the pervasive availability of
illicit small arms.
However, illicit small arms availability is
neither an independent variable in the social
matrix nor the root cause of social fragmen-
tation. It is rather a dependent variable
looming wherever certain social conditions
prevail. It regularly mutates into an active
virus in the context of elevated levels of so-
cial fragmentation which translates into a
widespread weakening of the state. The en-
suing security vacuum, in turn, constitutes a
dynamic pull factor of further illicit small
arms flows. Different social layers which can
not afford the services of the private security
industry seek to protect themselves through
the mostly illegal acquisition of firearms of
all kind (Cilliers&Mason 1999).
The formal and informal privatisation of se-
curity are indicators of a general trend to-
wards violence and the threat thereof be-
coming a dominant factor in the regulation of
social relations. Organised crime and local
gangs penetrate economic transactions and
weaken the rule of law (Gamba 1997). As a
result a dynamic process of internal rearma-
ment takes root in an increasing number of
states. Their societies are burdened with in-
tensifying levels of violence and their
economies with escalating transaction costs.
A projection of present socio-economic
trends in many regions suggests that wide-
spread disruptive consequences of the perva-
sive availability of illicit arms are to be ex-
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pected (International Federation 1997), if the
international community fails to find a fast
track to effectively decommission the surplus
stocks in danger to end up in illegal circula-
tion. In addition, it is necessary to create a
potent international body tasked with vigor-
ous intervention in black markets aiming at
drying them up.
Presently various entities within the United
Nations, intergovernmental bodies at re-
gional levels and a myriad of non-
governmental organisations have taken steps
to deal with the issue and started to combat
illicit trade and availability of small arms
(OSCE 1999; Laurance 1996; IANSA 1998;
Rana 1995; International Committee 1999;
Bulletin 1999; UNIDIR 1999; Boutwell et al.
1995; Singh 1995; Stiftung Wissenschaft 1998;
Commission of the Churches 1998; United
Nations 1998a). Unfortunately the wide-
spread political attention and the number of
institutions involved does not yet correlate
with measurable positive changes in the field
of controlling illicit small arms availability.
The endurance of this unrelenting situation
can be attributed to at least three underlying
factors. Firstly, the knowledge available in
the public domain of how small arms are il-
legally circulated is still rudimentary. It is
therefore difficult to implement customised
countermeasures and act in international co-
ordination. Secondly, most initiatives address
the problem from the supply side only. The
dynamics of the demand side often involve
politically sensitive issues like disputes over
the recognition of controversial governments
or economic interests which stifles the
chances of co-ordinated countermeasures.
Thirdly, small arms are often dealt with in
the tradition of the arms control debate dur-
ing the Cold War which fails to recognise the
different dynamics of the international pro-
liferation and intra-societal diffusion of illicit
small arms (Lock 1997). The proposal to add
small arms to the UN register of arms falls
into this category whereas dealing with the
problem in the context of the forthcoming
UN Convention on Transnational Organised
Crime seems more likely to produce effective
proposals.
However, more comprehensive approaches
are required to address the disastrous fall-out
of the global networks through which small
arms float illegally. Innovative concepts are
needed to respond to the largely intra-
societal dynamics of the pervasive low-level
destructive violence associated with illicit
small arms. The fact that the instrumental
dimension of this violence is about social in-
clusion and exclusion gives it a latent poten-
tial to escalate into civil war, which has be-
come the dominant form of current armed
conflicts whose victims are predominantly
civilians.
2. Structural determinants of the general se-
curity crisis
An outline of major features of the current
global context allows to identify some mutual
roots of the diverse forms of violence related
to small arms. The diverse processes summa-
rised as globalisation are reinforcing ine-
quality. The present course of development is
marked by continued polarisation of income,
both between nations (internationally) as
well as within nations (intra-societal). As a
result social segregation dominates the
changes in the social topography of societies
all over the world. Most visibly formerly
public spaces are increasingly being con-
verted into privatised and socially selective
malls. But spatial segregation of social classes
and other identity formations are pervasive.
In what sociologists have dubbed “global
cities”, i.e. the forerunners of globalisation
and modernisation social segregation mani-
fests itself in extremely developed forms
(Wilson 1997).
Except for some positive deviations in a few
well-off countries the regular economy is
marked throughout the world by increasing
levels of unemployment. As a result informal
economic activities increasingly become the
backbone of societal reproduction. This evo-
lution is not restricted to developing nations
and countries in transition. Particularly af-
fected are the new entrants to the segment of
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the economically active population. Unem-
ployment rates for the age group 14-24 years
of 50 % are prevalent in many countries.
Profound crises of the state finances and a
general disposition to curtail state functions
following the logic of the neo-liberal para-
digm reinforce each other and deprive the
state of the capacity to effectively deliver se-
curity to its citizens. As a result privatisation
of security is a pervasive trend. The private
security industry has turned into a vibrant
economic sector whose labour force already
exceeds the police forces in most countries. A
few globally operating companies dominate
this countercyclical sector which seems “cri-
sis-proof”. It is apparently not any longer the
“raison d’être” of the state to guarantee the
security of its citizens. Instead security and
particularly protection from violence, being a
fundamental human right, are in the process
of becoming a traded commodity. The adage
“My home is my (proactively protected) cas-
tle” is only now, in the post-modern age, de-
veloping its full meaning. Those who can not
afford protected castles and the proactive
commodification of their security are forced
to organise their self-defence outside the le-
gal parameters. As a result we are observing
the evolution of private security into a mutu-
ally reinforcing system of multi-polar societal
“rearmament” cascading down the social
ladder: It fosters an informal militianisation
of the entire society which starts at the lower
end of the social pyramid (Lock 1998c).
The underlying structure of these trends is
the restlessly globalising economic system, in
which the nation-state increasingly takes a
backseat. A closer look at the global economy
reveals that it is actually composed of at least
three distinct operational spaces, the regular,
the informal and the criminal economies.
Asymmetrical interaction between these
three spheres is a constitutive element of
their respective existence. The criminal sector
is by definition a parasitic sphere which
prospers through infiltration, extortion and
violent coercion in the other spheres, while
unequal exchange characterises the ex-
changes between the regular economy and
the informal economy (Lock 1998a).
The main characteristic of the regular econ-
omy is the rule of law at its core. Taxes are
generally paid, though the level of effective
taxation is generally declining. The unre-
lenting competition to attract inward invest-
ment has led to lower tax rates and excessive
tax exemptions, above all in special economic
zones like the famous “maquiladora” border
industries in Mexico. Most importantly
though, the meagre growth rates of the
regular economies do not keep pace with the
increase of the economically active popula-
tion seeking an entrance to this space.
Quantitatively the oceans of informal
economies dominate the global economy.
ILO estimates that almost 60 % of the eco-
nomically active population in Latin America
falls into the informal sector (ILO 1999). The
rule of law applies often only marginally. Its
rules reflect asymmetrical power structures.
Its dominant actors often resort to violence
for arbitration. Informal economies are glob-
ally the fastest growing economic space in
terms of participants. By definition the in-
formal sector hardly pays taxes, value added
taxes being an exception, when individuals
(rarely) interact as consumers with the regu-
lar economy. Often welfare levels generated
in the informal sector hardly exceed the most
basic subsistence, but the sector contributes
to the welfare in the regular economy mainly
through interaction in form of cheap services
of all kind. Another part of its produce is si-
phoned off into the coffers of criminal actors
who impose their terms wherever the rule of
law is not effectively supported by the state
and people do not have the means to protect
themselves.
In the globally organised criminal economy
by definition the rule of law does not apply.
There is ample evidence that the criminal
economy is the fastest growing space in the
global economy in terms of turnover and
profits. The criminal economy constitutes a
parasitic link between the spaces of the
regular and the informal sectors of the econ-
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omy (United Nations 1998b). Conservative
estimates presented at an IMF- and EBRD-
sponsored seminar put the global gross
criminal product (GCP) at 1000 billion US $
(Reinicke 1998), this compares with a GNP
for sub-Saharan Africa of 330 billion US $, of
which the RSA alone accounts for more than
one third.
At the level of nation-states these three
spheres of the global economy interact in dif-
ferent proportions reflecting the relative
strength of the state. But in spite of enormous
differences in the respective configuration of
the economies at the level of nation-states,
one destabilising structural variable has
emerged almost universally during the nine-
ties; it is a particularly gloomy feature,
namely unacceptably high rates of youth un-
employment. This pervasive feature seems to
confirm the existence of interdependent pat-
terns in the global economy, no economy can
extricate itself from under the prevailing
machination of the global economy. The in-
capacity of most economies to integrate the
younger generations into the regular labour
market, as they reach the age of normal en-
try, provides a teeming yeast to the illegal
and criminal economic circuits and an un-
limited reserve army for intra-state armed
conflicts. The exclusion of the current gen-
eration aiming to enter the pool of the eco-
nomically active population from the tradi-
tional intergenerational continuity of eco-
nomic roles is particularly acute in many
third world countries. Due to the unrelenting
processes of economic modernisation the
traditional succession of professional roles is
replaced by migration towards the urban
spheres which can not cope with the on-
slaught of masses of unqualified labour. Most
embarrassingly in many failing states the
levels of the average education are falling, in
some cases dramatically. This inter-
generational decline of educational levels is
being further acerbated by the age composi-
tion in many developing countries whose
population under the age of 18 constitutes 50
% or more of the total, as is the case for sub-
Saharan Africa.
But developed countries are affected as well.
The constant migration of jobs throughout
the global market place towards ever cheaper
locations of production tends to reduce job
offers for less qualified labour in many ad-
vanced countries as well. Certain vulnerable
groups like minorities and above all young
people with less than average educational
records tend to become excluded from the
regular economy and provide a reserve army
easily attracted by the jobs the criminal sector
of the economy is offering (Martinez 1998).
This is by no means restricted to drug traf-
ficking. The heavily biased sociological com-
position of the prison population and its
steady growth clearly reflect the specific
pattern of exclusion in each country (Stern
1998).
Radical modernisation in most Third World
and transition economies in the course of the
current globalisation is often embedded in a
general economic crisis and hence declining
employment. These economies have never-
theless urgently to find the means and strate-
gies to overcome the tense and expanding
intergenerational economic divide, lest so-
cietal violence will prevail. Illicit small arms
availability empowers the malignant forces
of societal polarisation and confrontation. In
the absence of other chances to develop self-
respect, the ownership of an illegal firearm
provides idle young males with a surrogate
for an accepted role in society (Richards
1996). Thus, the combination of the inde-
pendent variable (large numbers of idle
young males) and the dependent variable
(copious availability of illicit small arms)
converge into a terrifying time bomb, the in-
ternational community appears unable to dif-
fuse for the time being, possibly because the
dangers have not yet been clearly identified.
In such contexts amorphous forms of
emerging violence are permanently in danger
to take on an ideological guise and eventu-
ally escalate into intra-state armed conflicts
along the lines of perceived identities and
envisioned exclusion. Often such conflicts
turn into protracted wars because in the ab-
sence of viable economic perspectives war
fighting becomes a surrogate mode of pro-
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duction for many actors. Contrary to con-
ventional interstate wars the civilian popula-
tion is the foremost target which explains the
streams of refugees and internally displaced
persons as well as the elevated percentage of
civilian victims in current armed conflicts
(International Committee 1999; UNHCR
1997).
3. The dynamics of privatisation of security
The privatisation of security advances from
two ends. At the one end there is the top-
down privatisation of security. Here the state
gradually retreats as the sole agency to guar-
antee the security of its citizens and delegates
the pursuit of the monopoly of legitimate
violence to private agencies. At the other end
there is the bottom-up privatisation of secu-
rity. Here individuals either loose trust in the
state and take up their own precautions or
are effectively abandoned by the existing
state agencies. The process embarks with
measures of passive protection of the habitat
and leads eventually to privately policed
proactive segregation. Normally it starts at
the top of the social pyramid, where people
can afford considerable investments and the
employment of security personnel. But at the
bottom criminal protection gangs may take
root in parallel as social fragmentation pro-
duces no-go areas for the police. What starts
as an apparently legitimate reaction to per-
ceived insecurity produces a reactive social
dynamic. The visible organisation of private
security is self-promoting because it induces
feelings of insecurity outside the parameters
of its service. The commodification of secu-
rity is contagious. All social layers begin to
organise their respective self-defence because
efficient security at one end means concen-
tration of criminal energy at the opposite
end. The cascading of private security down
the social ladder enlarges existing social
cleavages and hardens social fragmentation.
But neither the top-down nor the bottom-up
privatisation of security necessarily infringe
the rule of law as long as the state is strong
and capable of regulating the private security
sector. However, in the context of a weak or
failing state or pointed social fragmentation,
which is clearly a dominant characteristic of
the present decade in many parts of the
world, privatisation of security turns into an
unbound process in which ultimately crimi-
nal violence arbitrates social conflicts. In this
evolution illicit availability of small arms
comes into play because it empowers the
competing coercive forces outside the rule of
law. As a force multiplier illicit small arms
accelerate the confrontational, through
asymmetrical  security strategies of different
social groups. The massive “target harden-
ing” and “self-ghettoisation” with the help of
extensive private vigilance offer protection
against criminal perpetrators by means of
social segregation. But as a result all criminal
energy is then directed towards social groups
with little capacity to defend themselves. As
a sad consequence a situation emerges where
life at the bottom of the social hierarchy turns
into a “criminal hell” where protection and
coercion can not any longer be meaningfully
distinguished. The precarious security situa-
tion in large parts of Colombia, the “favelas”
surrounding the megapolis in Brazil (Cano
1997) as well as apartheid settlements like
Soweto display such features (Gun Free
South Africa 1999).
Unfortunately the political and financial
status of many states is such that the security
personnel either serves the economic inter-
ests of the nomenclatura in command or they
depend on corruption and sell their services
in the market to the best paying customer.
Their official salary is often ridiculous, but
the position remains an asset which can be
monetised in the informal or the criminal
spheres of the economy. Corruption, moon-
lighting, mostly as private security agents but
also as criminal actors amount to an informal
privatisation of the security function of the
state. The pervasive availability of small arms
converts the situation in failing states into an
internal action-reaction rearmament involv-
ing incumbent rulers who control the state
and diffuse social groups which accentuate
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their identity in the process (Lock 1998c). The
automatic guns involved are such a terrifying
force multiplier that even children can par-
ticipate in terrorising and eventually para-
lysing the basic functioning of the society.
In the course of this escalating scenario of
“radically privatised” security the economy
is burdened with increasing transaction costs
related to security which eventually lead to a
downward spiralling economic condition.
International business consultancies have
already developed a scale to gauge the costs;
it is called GAD (Gray Area Dynamics) and
runs from 0 to 100 percent. At the very upper
end of this scale armed violence begins to
constitute a mode of (re)production for those
who fight their exclusion from the circle of
economic reproduction. The core group of
such actors are young males who have little
chances to become a productive member of
the society under the prevailing circum-
stances. The attraction for young males to
establish themselves by displaying violence
is reinforced by the fact that the culturally
conveyed gender superiority is not any
longer corroborated by their roles in the
economy and reserved male workplaces. In-
stead young males are driven to assert their
masculinity in participating in the produc-
tion of violence (Lutz& Nonini 1999).
Finally, in the context of failed states eco-
nomic actors sometimes draft paramilitary
forces or foreign security services offering
military capacities aiming to isolate their
economic interests from the general turmoil
and to continue their profitable trade. Ille-
gally supplied arms and foreign personnel
with a dubious status are regularly involved.
The existence of vibrant criminal networks in
the global economy and militarily qualified
surplus labour enable this particular form of
complete privatisation of security, even
against the outspoken will of the interna-
tional community (Cilliers&Mason 1999;
Musah 1999; Reno 1998).
However, before becoming too despondent
over present trends, it should be recognised
that the ideal-type security order with the
state fully commanding the monopoly of le-
gitimate coercion, which usually serves as a
benchmark for judging specific situations,
existed, if ever, only at the end of the post-
WWII boom in social-democratic states in
Europe. And even there major changes of the
security order are looming (Trotha 1995).
This should not come as a surprise as the
three spheres of economic circulation operate
globally and affect even the most well-to-do
nations. This coincides with an strong polari-
sation of incomes and the ensuing spatial
segregation of society.
4. The current dynamics of illegal prolifera-
tion and intra-societal diffusion of small arms
The current snowballing of problems associ-
ated with the widespread illicit availability of
small arms is among others related to the end
of the Cold War. During the Cold War legal
and illegal proliferation of small arms were
both pervasive, but, contrary to the present
pattern of proliferation, these transfers were
legitimated by one or the other side of the
ideological confrontation. When non-
governmental actors were supplied, as was
often the case, this meant under-cover opera-
tions, for which extensive networks were put
in place to allow for deniability. But at the
time all of the recipients of either clandestine
or open military support claimed to keep
control of or to take over a given territorial
state and deny access to the opposite camp
(Mathiak 1995). The volumes of weaponry at
the disposal of fighting parties bore no rela-
tion with the economic capacity of the re-
spective territory, Afghanistan, Angola and
Nicaragua being among the most conspicu-
ous cases of externally generated civil wars.
With the approach of the end of bi-polar
military competition the competing streams
of military supplies stopped. Most of these
supplies had been non-requited transfers, at
least with hindsight because the military
credits had to be forgiven.
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In a parallel process international creditors
began to put pressure on highly indebted
countries to consolidate their financial bal-
ance sheets. As a result legal military trans-
fers plummeted for lack of purchasing power
and soft credits and did not recover even in
regions plagued by wars, Turkey and re-
cently Eritrea and Ethiopia being an excep-
tion.
In the field of small arms, however, a dy-
namic illegal market emerged during the
present decade accompanied by soft gov-
ernment-to-government transactions of sur-
plus weapons and ammunition. The follow-
ing sections highlight firstly what can be de-
scribed as a supply side push due to the post-
Cold-War military downsizing and the fal-
tering institutional cohesion of armed forces
particularly in transition countries and sec-
ondly the economics of the demand side.
4a) Supply side push:
The Cold War allowed for the stocking of
arms beyond realistic requirements, even in
the maximalist context of scenarios of the
time. The political paranoia produced among
others secret arms caches throughout Europe.
Some of them were so secret that their bu-
reaucratic records were lost. So, Europe lives
not only with hidden uxos (unexploded am-
munition) from WW II, but it has to contend
with unexpected finds of small arms caches
hidden during the height of the Cold War.
While these caches are only an exotic exam-
ple of the heritage of the Cold War, bulging
stores of ammunition and automatic weap-
ons that were scattered for strategic reasons
over the entire state territory marked the
situation in most NATO and WTO (Warsaw
Treaty Organisation) countries.
Most western countries immediately engaged
in word-wide surplus sales as well as dona-
tions initiating in this way a process which
has been labelled “cascading” towards the
lower end of the international hierarchy.
With respect to leakages into black market
circulation this process meant a transfer from
relatively safe storage towards sometimes
less protected, politically fragile environ-
ments. There is no evidence that WTO coun-
tries other than the former GDR acted simi-
larly fast at the governmental level. Instead
those countries attempted to foster the export
of weapons which continued to be produced
by the oversized arms industry which had
lost their domestic markets due to financial
constraints. Only a small number of custom-
ers were attracted by weaponry of Soviet de-
sign, even at the offered dumping prices. It
took Russia almost eight years to establish a
separate agency for export marketing of sur-
plus weapons (Pierre&Trenin 1997).
The dramatic downsizing of military budgets
in all former WTO-countries had immediate
destabilising effects on the entire military or-
ganisation. The headlines were full of reports
on shady deals. The central European states
overcame this destabilisation relatively fast,
but throughout the former Soviet Union the
military institution has continued to fall
apart, corruption is rife and central control is
virtually lost. In Russia the once unified Red
Army had to compete for funds with several
other powerful armed bodies and addition-
ally  lost qualified personnel to the expand-
ing private security industry, booming
within as well as outside the rule of law. In
the established Soviet tradition that stealing
from the state involves no moral wrongdo-
ing, military property transmuted into a
commodity which was appropriated and il-
legally marketed if a solvent customer could
be identified.
It started with the retreat of the Red Army
from Germany and continues unmitigatedly
to date, the plundering of state arsenals and
the illegal sale both within the former Soviet
Union as well as to international black mar-
kets. Large quantities of ammunition and
small arms in possession of the Western
Group stationed in Germany never returned
to Russia, instead they found their way to the
battlefields of the Bosnian war. In the case of
small arms many reports on black market
sources refer to the Ukraine and Bulgaria
(Human Rights Watch 1999), but this may
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only reflect the logistical sophistication black
marketers from these countries have devel-
oped. The continued atrophy of the former
Soviet military complex guarantees for the
time being that the arsenals can be tapped
upon demand provided sufficient cash is at
hand. And most importantly the immense
stores of weaponry hoarded in Soviet times
are not exhausted and will fuel black markets
unless the armed forces are radically
downsized and reformed (Thurbiville 1996).
Since for the time being the respective gov-
ernments neither have the inclination nor the
resources to destroy the vast surplus stocks,
black marketers will continue to benefit from
this lucrative playing field where the wares
globally in demand can easily be secured.
Small arms have a low visibility which fa-
cilitates concealed logistics. Therefore they
are more difficult to police than major weap-
ons. As mass produced commodities their
source is often difficult to trace.
However, it is often overlooked that illicit
small arms are flowing both directions, in
and out of the former Soviet Union. The
weapons of choice of the organised crime in
Russia and elsewhere are sophisticated mod-
els mostly procured on the largely uncon-
trolled private market in the United States.
The logic of committing crimes with such
“luxury” weapons lies with the reduced
traceability of these imported weapons which
diminishes the risks of the perpetrator to be
detected. This example draws attention to the
fact that regulatory deficits are not restricted
to countries in transformation or otherwise
particularly weak states (Gonchar&Lock
1994).
Permeable arsenals which are targeted by
arms traffickers exist in many more countries
where the state fails to properly pay its per-
sonnel or functions as a corrupt corporation
only. Furthermore Latin American countries,
above all Mexico, are permanently inquiring
with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms about small arms identi-
fied in armed conflict, individual murder
cases and other crimes, because they have
originated in the United States and were ille-
gally imported (Tokatlian&Ramirez 1995).
The numbers involved have five digits which
indicates the interrelatedness of distant
regulatory spheres when it comes to the
sources of the international black market of
small arms. The regulatory order of the in-
ternal American market has unacceptable
global ramifications as does the disorder in
the former Soviet Union. Of course the list of
countries whose regulatory deficiencies in
the field of small arms radiate internationally
is long. But it can not be explored in full de-
tail in the context of this overview which
merely attempts to highlight the need of si-
multaneous co-ordinated international action
and unilateral steps to curb the sometimes
rampant illicit availability of small arms.
4b) Demand side economics:
Societal violence, crime, organised crime,
armed conflicts, intra-state wars, and even
some international wars are no longer dis-
crete events. A profound paradigmatic
change of the concept of war has taken root.
If conflict resolution is to succeed, the new
paradigm of armed conflicts must be taken
into account. With the transformation of the
character of wars their causes and the logic
for their continuation are also changing.
After the Cold War armed conflicts are more
directly constrained by the economic re-
sources the fighting parties can mobilise lo-
cally. Therefore a proper understanding of
the underlying economics of on-going wars
is a precondition to design efficient sanctions
and other interventions intended to end the
fighting and the often ensuing low-intensity
violence. In the context of current civil wars
the roles of politician, war commander, mo-
nopoly trader and organised crime leader
blend gradually. Radical ideologies manipu-
lating often spurious identities serve as a
cynical cover of shrewd personal, mostly
economic interests of such leaders and their
entourages. Yet the ideological grip they hold
over the population in war zones as well as
among refugees on the basis of constructed
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identities endows them with effective negoti-
ating power vis-à-vis the international com-
munity. As a result war criminals become a
party of peace deals and can carve out a safe
position for themselves in the post-conflict
setting. Understanding these often complex
power equations is indispensable for peace
negotiators.
With the end of the Cold War non-requited
transfers in support of fighting parties in in-
ternal wars are rarely available, diaspora
contributions fuelling conflicts “at home”
being an exception (Angoustures&Pascal
1996). The required resources to sustain in-
ternal wars must now be collected and accu-
mulated locally, often by force and blackmail.
It follows that almost by definition fighting
parties turn into complex economic conglom-
erates, often commanded by wealthy traders
turned warlords. Above all the non-state
parties in conflict must generate foreign cur-
rency to pay in cash for their military resup-
ply on the black market. Every automatic
gun, every round of ammunition fired into
the air by a child soldier embodies an eco-
nomic circulation involving commodity ex-
changes with international markets, at least
in all countries where the arms are not manu-
factured domestically. It also presupposes the
generation of a corresponding economic sur-
plus and the directed use of the surplus to
illegally import arms. Since the eventual
placement of the surplus in mostly oversup-
plied global markets of raw materials re-
quires in many cases illegal transactions, the
marketed surplus fetches only heavily dis-
counted prices. In other words the illegal re-
supply of arms is costly, even if the actual
c.i.f. prices for the weaponry are low due to
the present oversupply.
Illegal transactions are a common denomi-
nator of “war economies”. Global networks
of criminal traders facilitate access to illegal
markets. On a global scale illegal economic
activities appear to witness higher growth
rates than the regular economy. These “mar-
kets”, however, are characterised by high risk
premiums and violence. They serve as re-
supply stores and as force multipliers for
warring parties and create a class of war
profiteers, both inside and outside the con-
flict zone. Given this array of interested par-
ties “war economies” tend to become stable
patterns which is reflected in a continuously
longer duration of civil wars (Keen 1998).
They tend to become a “mode of production”
for the dominant actors. But this weird mode
of production regularly implies destruction
for large segments of the economy as looting
and blackmailing are among the preferred
strategies of surplus generation. Chechnya
comes to mind in this context. Internally dis-
placed persons and refugees are almost a
natural product of this “destructive mode of
production”. Individual survival strategies in
such deteriorating circumstances often face
the alternative either to join the looting “war
fighting” actors or to face starvation and ex-
pulsion.
Empirical studies have so far identified sev-
eral major sources which sustain warring
parties in on-going armed conflicts and
therefore fuel the demand for small arms on
the black market (Jean&Rufin 1996; de Waal
1997; Duffield 1998). Firstly, illegal export of
minerals and raw materials by means of a
reckless exploitation of the local biosphere.
Tropical wood, gems, diamonds, ivory and
minerals lead the list of products which enter
the global market through questionable
channels in support of “war economies”.
Secondly, drug production and trafficking
are regularly an important element in “war
economies”. Afghanistan is a scarcely veiled
case of a “drug economy” and Colombia an-
other. The world atlas of drugs shows that
international trafficking routes take advan-
tage of the control vacuum in weak states
and countries involved in low-level violence
and armed conflict, Thirdly, the appropria-
tion and misuse of humanitarian aid seems to
be pervasive in the environment of many
armed conflicts (Anderson 1999). Though
there is no easy solution to overcome this di-
lemma for international aid agencies, it is ob-
vious that the competition among private
agencies whose vested interest is to provide
humanitarian aid play into the hands of
warlords who manage to appropriate hu-
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manitarian aid to foster their ends. The best
documented case is Sudan, where bandits
and fighting factions create hunger in order
to attract humanitarian aid which is appro-
priated or taxed when it arrives (de Waal
1997). Fourthly, international embargoes
sometimes strengthen the position of the lo-
cal warlord by creating a profitable black
market controlled by him and his cronies
while it impoverishes the majority of the
population. They then have the choice of ei-
ther filling their Swiss bank accounts or step-
ping up the war fighting. Fifthly, in some
cases the different diaspora communities
volunteer to finance the war back home. But
often they face extortion by clandestine
criminal gangs which collect “war taxes”.
The Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka are reported
to have perfected this source of income by
drafting asylum seekers who are being
milked once they have arrived in Canada or
Norway for example. Flourishing industries
of kidnapping and protection rackets in turn
may herald an escalation towards armed con-
flict over the control of different turfs. This
has always a potential of developing antago-
nistic identities which if ruthlessly exploited
may lead to low-intensity warfare, as a mili-
tianisation (Marchal 1997) of the entire soci-
ety sets in as a reaction.
This description of resources tapped and
mobilised by “war economies” is far from
complete, but it allows the prediction that,
without shoring up the regular economy
from permanent criminal infiltration with
illegally traded commodities, the sheer vol-
ume of effective demand for small arms on
the black market will continue to render ex-
isting controls ineffective. The reason being
that the present level of demand offers suffi-
cient rewards to mobilise criminal actors who
are disposed and capable of outsmarting ex-
isting control regimes. This pattern is rein-
forced by the existence of many weak states
whose control regimes are not properly ad-
ministered.
However, it is important to recognise that the
underlying logic of every illegal economic
activity aims at legalising the proceeds which
requires safe entry points into the legal eco-
nomic circulation (Reno 1998). This indispen-
sable exchange between illegal black market
activities and the regular commodity and
monetary circulation makes “war economies”
vulnerable to well-targeted interventions by
the international community. In other words
the lack of efficient controls of criminal eco-
nomic activities and the frequent collusion of
sovereign states (not only of tax havens) are
the fertile ground where “war economies”
are grafted into the global market.
A recent change of policy by DeBeers points
the way to go. After twenty years of collusion
with Savimbi’s UNITA by tacitly marketing
its diamonds, DeBeers which controls the
diamond markets through a cartel agreed in
fall 1999 not to purchase any longer dia-
monds originating from UNITA (Mallet
1999). It was public pressure by non-
governmental organisations which finally
forced DeBeers to take this step and to com-
ply with a mandatory UN-regulation.
Without real resolve to combat the criminal
economic circulation little progress is to be
expected in constraining parties involved in
armed conflicts and in luring them to con-
sider a non-violent conflict resolution. In
particular, it should at last be taken into ac-
count that most traditional international em-
bargoes have reinforced the income concen-
tration and the criminal control of the em-
bargoed economies in the hands of the in-
cumbent rulers who were the target of the
embargo. An ill-conceived embargo has the
potential to initiate a self-reproducing pat-
tern where the power of a criminalised elite
profits from the continuation of the fighting
as well as the embargo (Keen 1998).
Milosevic and the nomenklatura of his re-
gime apparently became addicted to this
condition.
While the killings and human suffering in
on-going wars appear to be absolutely irra-
tional from an outside perspective, it may be
hypothesised that apart from the material
rewards from looting etc. joining the fighting
can be at a certain stage an advantageous
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survival strategy as nine out of ten victims in
current internal wars are civilians. This
would explain the military dynamics in ob-
viously desperate situations and that forced
recruitment is less pervasive than is reported
in the media. This pattern also foreshadows
serious problems in post-conflict times. It is
important to anticipate that conceivable post-
conflict scenarios are likely to have many los-
ers, to whom an end of the fighting appeared
undesirable. Once ended without compre-
hensive proactive outside support fighting is
likely to be resumed as an income generating
activity or alternatively criminal elements
maintain a tight grip on the economy and
stifle any dynamic market-oriented devel-
opment (World Bank 1999). The present post-
conflict situation in El Salvador highlights
this danger. Many economic transactions are
not controlled by the market, instead they are
regulated by violence or the threat thereof.
As a result today in El Salvador more people
are being killed annually with firearms than
during the civil war.
This short synopsis of the economics pre-
vailing in most current armed conflicts sug-
gests that the term civil war is not any longer
appropriate (Kaldor 1999). Firstly, the fight-
ing parties do not any longer necessarily as-
pire to take over state and reconstruct it; sec-
ondly, their organisation and ethics resemble
criminal gangs more than anything else. The
combination of these features explains as to
why in more and more cases the vast major-
ity of the population opposes the internal
armed confrontation, but has no leverage on
the fighting groups.
5. Comprehensive measures to reduce illicit
small arms availability
In the light of the ease of illegal supply and
the economic forces creating effective de-
mand for small arms at different levels, it is
urgent to take internationally co-ordinated,
energetic measures to curb the illicit flows of
small arms. But unfortunately the complexity
of the issue and the different settings
throughout the world do not prepare for a
fast consensus on measures to take at the in-
ternational level nor is it likely that such a
consensus allows for dynamic actions to curb
illicit flows of small arms. National “gun”
cultures and the presently prevailing political
conditions among nation-states are simply
too diverse for the creation of the well-
targeted regime. Therefore measures taken
without further delay at local, national and
regional levels must serve as precursors for
an eventual set of international conventions.
Any delay of instituting national measures
while waiting for international harmonisa-
tion will cause additional harm impossible to
repair at later stages. Unilateral initiatives
also serve as important role models, which
will help to draw hesitant governments into a
world-wide coalition focusing on the elimi-
nation of illicit small arms availability. It is
important that presently safe countries do
not mistakenly take their status for granted,
because in times of globalisation no economy
is immune against producing social frag-
mentation, “inner cities”, “bidonvilles”, “no
go areas for the police” and other pull fac-
tors. The three economic spheres are spread-
ing like fog around the globe and the crimi-
nal economy has inevitably penetrated or-
derly, developed societies as well. Drug traf-
ficking is often offering an initial leverage for
the criminal sector to expand into otherwise
well regulated economies.
No single measure will provide an encom-
passing solution, but an array of improved
controls and proactive measures will eventu-
ally curb the proliferation and diffusion of
small arms. If the industrialised countries fail
to understand the dynamics of this problem,
they will be confronted with pervasive
armed violence in many states which puts
the very existence of these states in danger
and successively the global economy as well.
Against this background selective, often dis-
parate measures designed to reduce the illicit
availability of small arms and their malig-
nant role in fostering societal fragmentation
will be discussed in the second section. It
does not enumerate the various proposals
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presently discussed in the on-going small
arms debate, mostly related to tightening ex-
port controls, this presentation seeks instead
to complement this discussion with partially
innovative measures to curb illicit small arms
availability.
II. Proposals
1. Gathering information on black markets
Black market networks appear to be able to
deliver small arms, if necessary in large
quantity, whenever and where ever effective
demand articulates itself. Proactive interven-
tion to halt illegal flows across borders by
custom services and police forces is presently
not feasible because too little is known about
these networks, their warehouses, the opera-
tion of their financial settlements and, not
least, their collaborators within governmental
agencies around the world. While the intelli-
gence agencies of certain states ought to have
a fair understanding of the black market, be-
cause some of these actors were used as
proxies during the Cold War to perform de-
niable supplies,  this information is not
shared internationally with control agencies
nor is it available in the public domain. Thus,
improving the control of small arms trade
requires reliable information on the basis of
world-wide field observation and data col-
lection.
Surprisingly up to now no institution collects
continuously data on the illicit proliferation
of small arms. There is urgent need to create
an independent source of information in this
field. Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (abbr. SIPRI) (SIPRI 1999) and Ob-
servatoire géopolitique des drogues, Paris
(abbr. OGD) (Observatoire 1995; idem 1996)
are excellent role models for an efficient in-
stitutional form to collect reliable information
on the illicit proliferation and societal diffu-
sion of small arms. SIPRI in the field of major
arms transfers and OGD in the case of drug
trade have proven that a modest, but tar-
geted research effort unfettered by political
intervention can highlight  sensitive transac-
tions, the actors themselves are not disclos-
ing, simply by systematically screening open
sources. After 20 years the United Nations
finally assimilated the investigative work of
SIPRI and instituted its own register of trans-
fers of major weapons. A similar initiative
within the United Nations in the field of
drugs will probably take a few more years. In
the case of small arms this process has not
even been started.
It is to be hoped that a smaller country like
the Netherlands, Belgium or Switzerland will
fill this obvious gap in the landscape of re-
search in the near future and support an in-
dependent research facility serving as a
global small arms observatory. At present
preparatory steps are being taken in Swit-
zerland to publish a yearbook on small arms
issues and in Belgium to set up a small
documentation centre on black market flows.
But given the dimension of the problem these
initiatives need to be strengthened and sup-
plemented by complementary work in the
field.
2. Improving information gathering
An important element to enlighten our
knowledge about the illegal flows of small
arms is comprehensive and reliable informa-
tion from the places where they are being
used in armed conflict and crime. From jour-
nalists to humanitarian aid workers there are
many yet untapped, potential sources of
much improved information, provided these
observers are qualified to report in correct
detail what weapons they observe during
conflicts. One way of qualifying them would
be the widespread availability of a concise
small arms and ammunition identification
booklet. It would allow them among others
to tell the difference between an Uzi, Galil,
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Kalashnikov, G-3 or FN without looking for a
label and thus better the quality of press as
well as institutional reporting. If collected
such data will help to simulate the black
market dynamics.
Since humanitarian organisations are se-
verely obstructed in their work as a result of
the almost effortless availability of small
arms in many conflict zones, it should be in
their interest to improve the information on
black market networks which supply regions
of conflict with arms and ammunition. An-
ticipating the creation of a global small arms
observatory humanitarian organisations
should sponsor the production and global
distribution of a simple small arms identifi-
cation booklet. The necessary knowledge can
easily be transferred from the military into
the civilian domain. Jane’s Infantry Weapons
or Ezell: Small Arms Today could serve as a
source. It would certainly improve the qual-
ity of reporting on armed conflicts and so-
cietal violence and cumulatively provide in-
formation which will eventually allow the
reconstruction of illicit flows of small arms as
a precondition to targeted intervention as
opposed to the impossibility of perfecting
existing trade controls.
3.Improving the control of legal transfers
Improved policing of illicit transactions is the
most obvious step to take, in order to curb
the black market. All present international,
mostly regional initiatives pledge to improve
the standards of controls. But this may not
prove to be sufficient to curb the illicit trans-
fers. In some cases governments do not have
the infrastructure necessary to effectively
control the transactions originating on their
territory. An efficient and internationally co-
ordinated plan of action must include a
broad range of measures. Some important
measures, however, which are geared to-
wards structural improvements produce sub-
stantial results only in medium and long
term. Other steps could be taken instantly to
discourage fraudulent exports.
All attempts to improve controls must depart
from the hypothesis that virtually all small
arms enter circulation as a legal commodity,
but it is during their often several decades
long life cycle that a significant percentage
transmutes into the illegal sphere. Targeted
controls presuppose sound hypotheses con-
cerning the most likely points of leakage into
illicit circulation.
3a) The case for a transaction deposit
An important source of illegal flows is the
falsification of export licenses or export con-
signments never reaching their documented
destination. Some traditional exporters of
small arms like the Czech Republic simply do
not have the diplomatic network which is
indispensable to corroborate suspicious ex-
port applications. In order to facilitate an
adequate control of licensed exports without
burdening the tax payer with the costs which
might outweigh the economic value of the
transaction, the introduction of a transaction
deposit might considerably improve the ef-
fectiveness of governmental controls. In or-
der to avoid the creation of competitive dis-
advantages for smaller producing countries
less capable of certifying the correct execu-
tion of export transactions, all arms exporting
countries should agree to charge an export
deposit for licensed small arms exports. An
efficient first step could be the introduction
of this instrument by the European Union.
This would provide the EU with the leverage
to oblige all entry candidates to follow suit.
Given the fact that particularly in the field of
small arms some of the applying nations are
among the big suppliers throughout the
world, such a step is likely to significantly
reduce the present level of “leakage”.
Export control bureaucracies and custom
services are regularly confronted with
fraudulent documentation which are not easy
to detect. It is not known how often licensed
arms exports are converted into an illicit
commodity during the transaction and end
up in wrong hands. The increasing number
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of cases of attempted fraud may reflect im-
proved scrutiny of the controlling institu-
tions, but it is also possible that fraud is gen-
erally on the increase.
Major weapon systems have a certain visibil-
ity which makes an eventual detection of a
fraudulent transaction likely. This condition
does not pertain to small arms, ammunition
and spare parts, the case of smaller arms is
different. For a variety of reasons SIPRI (SI-
PRI 1999; Lock 1993) never attempted to
cover small arms in its transfer registers.
Firstly data were difficult to come by, sec-
ondly, in the context of the military confron-
tation between West and East the issue was
not given high priority, and thirdly, it was
argued that small arms would constitute a
certain proportion of the trade in major arms
and could thus be assessed ceteris paribus.
While the latter has certainly not been the
case given the fact that most internal wars are
predominantly fought with small arms and
generate demand for a specific range of in-
fantry weapons, it remains a sad reality that
even today very little is known about the
trade in small arms in general (Naylor 1995).
Additionally since the mid-eighties the en-
during economic and financial crisis
throughout large parts of the Third World
has weakened governmental bureaucracies in
a significant number of smaller countries to
such an extent that it has apparently become
easy to corrupt them and obtain forged
documents which facilitate consignments of
small arms to illegal destinations. Black mar-
ket traders are thus able to generate perfectly
looking documents even without exploiting
the sophistication of modern computers and
copy machines. In short, false destinations
seem to be internationally on sale, moreover
the number of ports where customs offices
are inexpensive to bribe are apparently nu-
merous facilitating convenient re-routing of
shipments to an illegal destination.
But a similar observation points to some of
the smaller transition countries where the
capacities of the export control administra-
tion are limited. The administration does
neither have the personnel nor the logistical
means to thoroughly check the applications
for export licenses and to supervise the cor-
rect execution of the respective shipments.
The smaller transition countries in Central
and Eastern Europe have typically consider-
able manufacturing capacities in the field of
small arms, which makes them an attractive
target for black market actors (Human Rights
Watch 1999; Saferworld 1999).
The known cases of fraud using a third
country as an entrepôt suggest that a certain
class of countries is emerging where the
agreed rules of international relations do not
apply any longer. Several fraudulent trans-
actions were reported in the literature in
which Paraguay has been implicated. This
must have serious implications for the proce-
dures of surveying arms transfers at the in-
ternational level. These countries must be
identified by consultative procedures among
exporting countries. At the same time all
suppliers have to institute measures which
make sure that the controlling body in the
exporting country maintains an efficient lev-
erage of intervention throughout the entire
transaction. Presently hardly any sanctions
are at hand to effectively sanction the
fraudulent re-routing of an export consign-
ment if the mishandling occurs beyond the
territorial borders of the exporting country
and the exporting company can not be di-
rectly implicated. Virtually no leverage exists
to undo the illegal delivery.
Given the continued pressure from the de-
mand side and the plentiful existence of
traders who dispose of the criminal energy to
enact fraudulent transfers, governmental
controls must be considerably intensified lest
illicit transactions will spread further. How-
ever, some supplier countries do not have the
resources required to effectively tighten con-
trols. More generally, it is difficult to justify
that the taxpayer should shoulder the con-
siderable costs which accrue from the indis-
pensable control procedures. The trade of
this commodity reflects above all the legiti-
mate entrepreneurial interest of the arms
manufacturer or trading company to make a
profit. The transaction costs should be fully
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part of the entrepreneurial cost calculation
and be reimbursed to the government. How-
ever, the black sheep among the exporters are
responsible for the escalation of the costs of
the control system. Charging exporters with a
standard fee would punish the law-abiding
exporters. Making a transaction deposit
compulsory for every licensed transaction
instead would allow for an automatic pun-
ishment if the transaction is not carried out as
stipulated in the license. In addition, the in-
terest earned during the deposit period
would help to cover the costs of controlling
arms exports.
Making a substantive transaction deposit
compulsory for every licensed transaction
would give the government a financial lever-
age to enforce a correct execution. A transac-
tion deposit of 25 or 50 % of the value of the
respective contract would serve as a power-
ful economic disincentive to all contracting
parties to engage in fraudulent transactions.
Because the deposit will only be returned af-
ter an independent source certifies the full
and correct execution of the licensed export, a
careful scrutiny of potential customers lies in
the self-interest of the exporting company.
Even under the worst-case assumption that a
ruthless exporter counts on losing the deposit
in his calculation, the weapons would arrive
at the black market at least 50 % more expen-
sive than the going market rate, leaving the
government with additional resources to
further improve controls.
The introduction of a transaction deposit al-
lows governments to act unilaterally and
shift the burden of proof to the exporting
party. It is conceivable to consider deposit
rates which decrease with the visibility of the
respective weaponry, dispensing major
weapon systems from any deposit. The lower
the visibility the more important substantial
deposits would be, because it is this end of
the illicit arms trade which relates to on-
going wars, societal violence and fragmenta-
tion of states.
3b) Obligatory certification*
Another strategy to make sure that licensed
exports are being carried out according to the
application would be to prescribe the execu-
tion of the transaction in detail. While dubi-
ous customers have a tendency to pay in
cash, which is, of course, most welcome to
the exporting company, it is conceivable to
outline obligatory steps, each licensed trans-
action has to comply with. A letter of credit
with a bank in the recipient country should
be made obligatory, additionally the certifi-
cation of the declared destination should be
included in the conditions of the letter of
credit, ensuring that the payment is only re-
leased after the consignment is confirmed to
have arrived at the stated destination.
Such a stipulation would bring into play the
existing private certification sector. The certi-
fication would be possible in most relevant
countries, because the industry is represented
in more than 140 countries. The estimated
costs of certification per consignment would
amount to roughly 500 to 700 US $. If made
obligatory in the context of the EU for exam-
ple the prescribed procedure would not dis-
criminate against any supplier. Given that
Europe is a large supplier in this field and
that many legitimate customers have strong
interests not to change the calibre and other
standards, it is realistic to assume that the
customers will carry the burden of the addi-
tional costs, particularly since this measure
would be taken in the best mutual interest of
states combating the scourge of illicit small
arms availability.
4. Avoiding the misuse of legal small arms
As mentioned already, virtually all mass-
produced small arms are manufactured and
traded in abidance by existing laws. How-
ever, at some point of their respective, long
life-cycles large quantities of small arms pass
                                               
* I am indebted to Ouliana Kolbina who investigated
the certification industry and to Mr. Müller from the
Association of Exporters in Hamburg for an exten-
sive interview on the feasibility of export controls.
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into the sphere of illegal circulation and mis-
use. Present levels of illicit small arms avail-
ability is the cumulative result of a large va-
riety of schemes which permanently re-
supply the illegal circulation of small arms
and ammunition. The various critical points
during the life-cycle of a weapon must be
addressed with specific control mechanisms
and measures of general prevention. A gen-
erally underestimated source of illegal circu-
lation is the legal private ownership of fire-
arms in countries with little restrictions at-
tached to private gun ownership. Regulative
schemes used in other fields provide an ori-
entation how firearms and ammunition can
be safeguarded from entering illicit circula-
tion and misuse and how liability can be
regulated.
4a) Liability of gun ownership
In the following the case for an obligatory
third party liability insurance will be estab-
lished. The transformation of legally pos-
sessed firearms (manufacturers, traders,
armed forces, law enforcement bodies, and
private licensees) into instruments of crime,
violence and internal warfare takes many
routes. It is an obvious truth that the criminal
energy in this process is not restricted to the
demand side. Greed, extra profit and passive
corruption, covert support and interference
(mainly by governments), fraud and negli-
gence are among the facilitating factors at the
supply end, while criminal energy and cor-
ruption are the main tools at the demand
side. By no means all facilitating factors are
punishable, nor are the sentences always
commensurate with respect to the often ap-
palling consequences of the ensuing criminal
offences and violations of human rights.
Generally the original owners are never held
liable on the basis of their negligence or ac-
tive participation for the damages the re-
spective firearms provoke during the illicit
phase of their life cycle. With respect to the
actual perpetrators claims of victims are often
of no avail because only in rare occasions suf-
ficient assets can be forfeited, while the
original owners under present laws are not
liable.
Therefore the liability of legitimate owners of
small arms, in case their weapons enter for
whatever reasons into illicit circulation and
are eventually identified to be implicated in
damages of various kind urgently requires
greater attention. As a first step it is proposed
to introduce a compulsory third party liabil-
ity insurance for every small arms item pro-
duced or traded irrespective of the status of
the ultimate legitimate owner. The logic of
this proposal draws among others upon the
regulation of car ownership in many coun-
tries as well as on already existing interna-
tional conventions regulating and securing
the liability in the case of international risks
like transport of oil and fissile materials at
sea. In the latter cases the international com-
munity perceived the need to react to
emerging large-scale dangers and established
an obligatory third party liability coverage.
Given the recognition that the indiscriminate
diffusion of small arms puts the existence of
entire states into danger, causes human suf-
fering and enormous economic damages al-
most everywhere, the situation is ripe for the
international community to agree on joint
measures to reverse present trends. This
would lend support to countries presently
most affected by the scourge of illicit arms
availability. A convention on the liability of
owners of small arms for engendered dam-
ages would be one such measure.
Cars and a guns are both commodities which
are at risk to cause major damages to third
parties, particularly when misused. The
damaging act itself may be perpetrated by a
third person following a theft or just by acci-
dent. A car owner is obligated to take out a
third party liability insurance, because the
state rightly wants to protect the victimised
third parties. Damages are covered irrespec-
tive of the financial capability of either the
owner or the actual perpetrator. The regula-
tion gives priority to the victim. It also pro-
tects the tax payer from being shouldered
with the bill as a debtor of last resort.
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It is striking that in the case of firearms third
parties are not protected in a similar manner
against accidentally or intentionally caused
damages when misused. Absolutely no li-
ability protecting third parties takes effect, in
case a firearm is stolen. This is a serious la-
cuna which should be corrected, particularly
since the general taxpayer is usually charged
with the costs provoked by the misuse of
firearms, alternatively victims are left with-
out compensation. The changes required can
be initiated unilaterally at the national level.
They should, however, rapidly expand into
an international convention, because illicit
circulation of firearms operates across bor-
ders. But the introduction of an obligatory
insurance will effect the situation only in the
long term. Additionally the international
community has urgently to find ways of
coping with the heritage of millions of small
arms already circulating illicitly and not cov-
ered by any insurance.
When discussing third party liability it is im-
portant to take into account that no institu-
tion or person entitled to possess firearms is
aloof from the risk of theft and eventual mis-
use of its inventory. This applies to the armed
forces as well as to the police, where the
custody of firearms is not always as tight as
one would expect. The need to introduce the
concept of liability is best illustrated by the
enormous damages caused by the huge stock
of small arms recklessly left behind by the
US-forces at the end of the Vietnam war.
These weapons were marketed off-shore by
the exhausted Vietnamese government, en-
tered the web of global illicit circulation and
surfaced in the hands of insurgents and
criminals all over the world engendering
untold suffering and enormous destruction.
It would offer an interesting exercise for in-
surance mathematicians to calculate the rate
that they would had to have charged the US-
army for each American gun left behind in
Vietnam to cover the (economic) risk of their
illegitimate use off the former Vietnamese
battlefield.
4b) Marking of weapons is a prerequisite to enact
additional safeguards
Every firearm carries the potential of creating
havoc, when misused. This risk must be
translated into costs which are to be born by
the legitimate holder. In order to implement
this logic, every firearm is to be produced
with an unique undeletable mark (number)
to allow for tracing of the original legitimate
owner. The most feasible moments in a life-
cycle of a firearm for collecting an insurance
fee to cover potential and statistically pre-
dictable damages are the first legitimate sale
after the production itself and every legiti-
mate trade transaction thereafter.
It seems evident that the private insurance
industry would collect a considerable fee
against a policy covering all possible liabili-
ties, taking into account the long life-cycles
and the enormous damage any firearm can
cause. The principle to charge the owner of
small arms with the costs of potential liabili-
ties would considerably increase the costs of
gun ownership. It would make the true so-
cietal costs of gun possession finally trans-
parent. It might also reduce the effective de-
mand for firearms as life-cycle costs increase
because this commodity is likely to be price
sensitive. Finally, a healthy pressure to im-
prove the safekeeping of firearms would
come from the insurance industry trying to
protect its stakes. Technological innovation,
like efficient personalised trigger locks,
would rapidly enter the market because such
firearms would in the end allow legitimate
gun owners to economise the insurance pre-
mium. The market mechanism would foster
innovation in the field of safeguarding and
neutralise the passionate resistance of gun
lobbies against tightening controls.
As a first step it would be important to es-
tablish the principle of compulsory third
party liability insurance to be levied on the
ownership of guns. It must apply to the
military and the police alike, because arms
stolen from their stock are as likely to become
the means of destructive acts as any other
firearm. From innovations like personalised
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trigger locks the security of police officers
would significantly benefit as they would be
not any longer in danger of being threatened
or killed with their own weapons. Different
insurance rates according to risk classifica-
tion are conceivable, but this is a technicality
which the insurance industry will easily
solve once this obligatory insurance is being
introduced and the different risks evaluated
by the industry. Such a regulation can be in-
troduced unilaterally, but the nature of illicit
circulation and international diffusion of
small arms strongly suggests to pursue in
parallel the implementation of an interna-
tional convention. For example, a sniper gun
stolen from the stores of the FBI might end
up in some remote country and be used in
terrorist activities. Thus, such a risk insur-
ance would have eventually to be operated as
an international trust fund charged to regu-
late cross-border liabilities. Enormous sums
can be involved when small arms not legiti-
mately possessed see action in violent con-
flict and civil wars. But it is time to make
transparent the true costs of small arms
which slip into black market circulation and
to induce in this way better controls.
The proposal to enact a compulsory insur-
ance clearly embraces market mechanisms to
achieve its ends and considers this an appro-
priate complement to tighter government
regulation of firearm ownership and trade. It
is likely to provoke an outcry from the gun
lobby and also from the armed forces and the
police. However, the latter must understand
that risk coverage is a reasonable principle.
For the government it would basically be a
zero sum game, it does not cause additional
expenditures, because uninsured damages
are in most cases paid for by the taxpayer in
any case. Once the problem is handled as
normal insurance business it will look less
threatening to legitimate owners of firearms,
because the increased costs will correspond
to their specific risk classification which they
can influence by adopting safeguards.
But the important aspect of the proposed
move is the translation of the risk small arms
embody into monetary terms, thus making
the costs of “gun cultures” transparent. The
increase in effective prices would discourage
overstocking at all levels and possibly reduce
the demand for new production as excessive
stocks will be marketed first. It also ends the
effective subsidisation of gun ownership.
Presently the taxpayer shoulders the dam-
ages ensuing in case of theft and misuse.
With an obligatory insurance the gun owner
would finally pay for the eventual damages,
his individual choice to carry a firearm pur-
porting to enhance his personal security en-
tails.
Of course, this short exposition can only pro-
vide a stimulus for a debate of how compul-
sory third party liability insurance for small
arms can contribute to improving the safety
standards, and reduce illegal circulation.
Small arms are a dangerous commodity, but
lack the normal treatment of dangerous
commodities. Otherwise long since some
obligatory insurance regime would have
been introduced as in the case of car owner-
ship. But as the problems are becoming more
pressing and costly every day, it should fi-
nally be possible to tackle them more vigor-
ously, in this case from the economic end and
call for an end of the effective subsidisation
of privately owned small arms. However,
innovative approaches to old problems al-
ways need a long breath and must work to-
wards winning wide political support.
5. An ammunition tax: the case for a demeri-
tional tax
Many observers would agree that the supply
of ammunition is a key factor in most on-
going armed conflicts. In many conflicts the
warring parties are absolutely dependent on
the efficiency of the logistics black marketers
are able to offer. This reliance on the black
market to supply the fighting forces intro-
duces an economic dimension into the politi-
cal equation which determines the level of
fighting and possibly the eventual disposi-
tion to seek a political solution of the conflict.
Moreover, as discussed in the first section, in
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some protracted conflicts fighting has virtu-
ally developed into a “mode of production”,
there the calculation of the “fighters” should
be particularly sensitive to the prices of their
“inputs”, not least because illicit trade net-
works operate on a cash basis in convertible
currencies.
In general, however, prices are low, quite of-
ten below the cost of manufacture as huge
stocks of surplus are being cascaded interna-
tionally in a chain reaction which increased
the likelihood of leaks filtering into black
markets. In contrast to the creation of new
jobs in the regular economy being virtually
unaffordable in the context of war-torn
economies, the economic threshold of turn-
ing armed violence into a profitable business
is rather low due to the pervasive availability
of cheap small arms.
The long shelf-life of most small arms sug-
gests to additionally explore the control of
ammunition supplies as a means to effec-
tively reduce the availability of operational
small arms at least in medium term. The de-
finitive consumption when used promises an
impact on the availability through improved
controls and significant increases in prices.
Against this background it is proposed to
lobby governments to levy a significant (con-
sumer) tax on all ammunition fitting small
arms used in armed conflicts. Such a tax
would be absolutely consistent with the his-
torical evolution of taxes and their legiti-
macy. An important element in the evolution
of taxes are levies on demeritorial goods, like
alcohol and tobacco. A tax on ammunition
would follow in this tradition where the state
acts on the basis of a consensus that a certain
commodity has negative external effects and
affects the common welfare. The current in-
ternational discussion indicates that this con-
sensus is rapidly maturing with respect to
small arms. The conversion of this consensus
into a consumer tax of ammunition is how-
ever unfortunately not yet on the political
agenda.
A tax on ammunition would be a non-fiscal
tax aiming at changing consumption patterns
and the behaviour of the consumers. Small
arms have become an increasingly important
public health issue, therefore they require a
health-oriented steering of consumption
patterns. In changing the relative price of this
commodity the government explicitly in-
tends to discriminate against the potential
(mis)use of this commodity. To make an im-
pact a rate between 100% and 200% should
be considered, in order to truly discriminate
against the unnecessary use and overstocking
of ammunition. Being a mass produced
commodity with only a limited number of
producers an ammunition tax should be col-
lected at the source.
The tariff must be levied for all ammunition
produced. This is perfectly acceptable be-
cause the tax is financially neutral for the
government as a legitimate customer. The
higher prices its agencies have to pay are
fully balanced by tax income. All private us-
ers of small arms would have to pay a pre-
mium for their hobby or for the privilege of
presumed self-defence with a firearm. This is
perfectly justified given the risks of inevitable
health-hazards due to the danger of illegiti-
mate use of privately owned firearms in case
of theft and other ensuing negative external
effects.
With respect to international trade in cases of
certified deliveries to legitimate governmen-
tal recipients the consumer tax would have to
be relinquished. In all other cases of export
the tax would be levied at the source. The
additional tax income would help to cover
the social costs of the misuse of firearms
which are presently shouldered by the gen-
eral tax payer. Given the fact that a tax levied
indiscriminately at the source would be col-
lected from foreign customers as well, a large
part of the tax income should be dedicated to
an international trust fund charged with
coping with the disastrous consequences of
reckless proliferation of small arms in the
past.
There are, of course, also arguments against
such a consumer tax. At the principle level
neo-liberal economists argue that any con-
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sumer tax infringes the liberty of the con-
sumer, but this tax intervention must be
weighed against the negative externalities of
the diffusion of small arms. “If we don’t, oth-
ers will do”(sell and export cheap, duty-free
ammunition), this standard argument against
national initiatives, will be advanced by the
different lobbies associated with the ammu-
nition business. This argument is not valid as
can easily be understood, when applied to
the cultivation of marijuana and other drugs,
in order to create additional jobs for farmers.
It will certainly be argued as well that the
stocks already in black market circulation
will earn windfall profits as a result of the
institution of such a tax. This will inevitably
be so, before black market stocks will begin
to be crowded out. It should also be taken
into consideration that the introduction of an
ammunition tax will provide an environment
for black market activities if neighbouring
states do not co-ordinate their tax policies.
The mutual history of the United States and
Canada provides a number of negative ex-
amples when different tax policies created
black markets and huge profits for cross-
border smuggling1.
But these hurdles are not insurmountable.
The history of demeritional taxing (Tipke
1993) shows a surprising convergence be-
tween different cultures and continents.
Ammunition seems to fulfil the properties
needed to justify an internationally co-
ordinated promotion of a tax. The most im-
portant factor bringing the international
community in line to a process of strictly ap-
plying a hefty consumer tax on ammunition
is the emerging consensus on the dangers of
small arms diffusion and the commonly felt
need to counteract this tendency.
From a security perspective the control of
ammunition and its taxing is by far more ef-
ficient at the source than at the level of the
ultimate consumer. It also allows for a rigor-
ous accountability of those legitimate inter-
national transactions which would not be
                                               
1 I am indebted to David De Clerq who drew my
attention to this aspect.
subject to taxation. Higher prices for ammu-
nition lower the chances of unlawful appro-
priation of ammunition, because all actors
will be less inclined to overstock ammunition
and the final demand is likely to display
some elasticity to prices as well. Finally, if the
major international suppliers (G-8 and
NATO member states among others) could
agree on a concerted tax on ammunition,
they would easily be able to muster sufficient
pressure to bring most other suppliers to con-
form to such an international tax regime as
happened with other demeritional taxes in
history.
5. Instituting a recycling deposit for all fire-
arms
Increasingly states intervene in markets and
put up regulations to make sure that envi-
ronmentally hazardous commodities are be-
ing properly recycled to avoid lasting nega-
tive effects if left as waste. Thus, car manu-
facturers will eventually be forced to recycle
their cars at the end of their useful life. The
costs of recycling will already be charged
with the sales price. To minimise the risk of
illicit firearm possession and black market
activities small arms should also come under
an obligatory recycling regime aiming at
eliminating a potential source of illicit trans-
actions (For a study on the destruction of
small arms see: De Clerq 1999).
All small arms items are particularly sensi-
tive commodities which constitute a potential
danger if the decommissioning does not lead
to the destruction and recycling of the com-
ponents. To insure a proper recycling of fire-
arms and decommissioned ammunition, a
recycling deposit should be charged with the
sale of firearms and ammunition. The deposit
must be a consequential sum, in order to
make it attractive for everybody to return any
weapon found or not any longer needed and
receive the deposit in cash. The deposit
should be calculated out of two components,
the costs of decommissioning and recycling
and the reward to make it attractive to return
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weapons. If further investigations of ammu-
nition supplies confirm that illicit refilling of
empty cases constitutes a problem, a deposit
should be levied on ammunition as well, in
order to secure the safe return of the cases to
the legal sphere. Aluminium soft drink tins,
also a mass produced item, carry such a de-
posit in Denmark.
Such a compulsory deposit would have a
double effect. It would elevate the economic
threshold to acquire firearms, but it would
also contribute to reduce the average life cy-
cle of the existing stock of weapons and
hence the availability to enter illicit circula-
tion in general. The incentive to decommis-
sion weapons and be rewarded by a refund is
likely to forestall the accidental appropriation
and entry of many firearms into illicit circu-
lation. If old stocks of ammunition can be
converted into cash, they are also less likely
to end up in the cross-border black markets.
A recycling deposit operates not unlike a
buy-back program, but its costs are borne by
the legitimate or tolerated owners of firearms
and it is made a permanent feature. Given
the large existing stock which was acquired
without the payment of a deposit, the start
capital would have to be advanced by the
government during the initial phase, while
the program would become self-financing
after a certain period. Compared to the po-
tential security gains the initial investment
required is modest.
7. Dual standardisation of calibres for all
small arms
An important measure to improve the control
of the illegal proliferation and diffusion of
small arms would be internationally agreed
standards for calibres of small arms which
strictly distinguish between weapons de-
signed to serve the military and in law en-
forcement and weapons designed for sport,
hunting and legal private ownership. One
could define new calibres, for example 4 mm
and 8 mm, as the exclusive standard for all
non-state actors who legitimately own a fire-
arm, while 5.56 mm, 7,62 mm and 9 mm
would be reserved for the military and the
police. Countries with restrictive ownership
laws could serve as precursors of what
should be developed into an international
regime. In a period of less than ten years
compulsory changes of the calibres of weap-
ons in private possession could be imple-
mented.
Such a set of norms would facilitate in the
long run much improved controls. It should
be acceptable to all nations because it does
not directly interfere with national regula-
tions of private ownership of guns. At the
same time it would be an important step to-
wards the marking of ammunition proposed
by the UN-expert group on ammunition (Re-
port 1999) as ammunition for official use and
private consumption would be unequivocally
identifiable. The private and the official
weapon markets would be absolutely sepa-
rated making it virtually impossible to sub-
stitute illegal supplies from one sphere with
wares from the other sphere. The diffusion of
arms and ammunition from official use to
illegal non-state ownership and illicit circu-
lation would become instantly transparent.
Liberal sales regulations with respect to pri-
vate acquisition of firearms and ammunition
would not any longer lead to illegal exports
of ammunition to feed international black
market networks which will be flooded with
automatic weapons of the presently prevail-
ing calibres for many years to come. It would
become inherently more difficult to procure
ammunition for illegally possessed automatic
weapons as their possession is globally re-
stricted to the military and the police. In a
transition period of ten years it should be
feasible to achieve a complete separation of
the two markets through a strict regime of
dual standardisation.
Once such a set of manufacturing norms is in
place, it will become easier to exert interna-
tional pressure against ammunition manu-
facturers supplying international black mar-
kets with non-private calibres. It may even be
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possible to win the consent of arms manu-
facturers for such a regime because the intro-
duction of such dual-standardisation would
mean additional business as many privately
owned arms would have to be refurbished to
comply with the new regime or replaced.
Measured against the damages caused by the
illicit availability of small arms an eventual
compensation for affected private gun own-
ers would not be costly.
8. International trust fund for the destruction
of surplus stocks of small arms
Large surplus stocks of small arms originat-
ing from uncontrolled accumulation of re-
serves during the Cold War remain a source
of illegal circulation which requires co-
ordinated international action. The cascading
of surplus weapons from the arsenals of in-
dustrial countries to the inventory of the
armed forces of less wealthy nations was
started in the early nineties. Unfortunately
the weaponry and the volumes involved
were often not commensurate with legitimate
needs of the recipient armed forces. Some-
times the suppliers were merely interested in
economising on recycling costs. As a result
these weapons ended up in the arms depots
with diminished safety against leakage into
illicit global circulation. More importantly,
however, the profound economic crisis in
most transition countries and in a significant
number of developing countries has weak-
ened the public services, including the mili-
tary to such an extent that the safety of the
arms depots is no longer guaranteed. In such
precarious circumstances an orderly recy-
cling of surplus arms is not feasible.
Measured against the enormous economic
damages and human suffering caused by the
global illicit small arms availability investing
in an international trust fund for the destruc-
tion of surplus stocks of small arms will pro-
duce high rates of return in form of foregone
damages. It is for this reason that the forma-
tion of an international trust fund for the de-
struction of surplus stocks of small arms,
possibly under the auspices of the United
Nations, should receive priority on the
agenda of the General Assembly.
Since many individuals and non-
governmental organisations would be sym-
pathetic to the creation of such a trust fund,
one might conceive this fund as a foundation
open to governmental as well as individual
contributions. It would be perfectly plausible
for concerned citizens around the world to
contribute to the destruction of small arms by
purchasing “disarmament shares or certifi-
cates”, if a credible foundation can be created
for this purpose. Such an initiative would
raise the visibility of this issue. Provided suf-
ficient funds can be assembled the trust fund
would actively pursue a strategy of identify-
ing critical surplus stock and offer its services
which in certain cases might involve in addi-
tion to destruction and recycling a compen-
sation for the lost (black) market value of the
weapons, in order to make it attractive to
governments to contract the trust fund for
surplus reduction.
With the Kosovo experience in mind where
the looted arsenals of Albania surfaced,
NATO should resolutely act and clear the
arsenals of all states aspiring membership or
other forms of association. NATO’s leverage
to enact a reduction of existing arsenals to
reasonable levels in former Warsaw Pact
member states must be used resolutely and
fast as it is well established that presently
black markets are supplied from within this
region. On the basis of NATO’s expanded
agenda such a program could be offered
globally as it is likely to reduce the probabil-
ity of future humanitarian missions in the
context of internal armed conflicts. NATO
would act in its best self-interest, but appar-
ently political pressure on the organisation is
still lacking.
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9. Active market intervention in illegal trad-
ing
The case for massive intervention in the ille-
gal circulation of small arms is highlighted
by the situation in certain border regions
where arms trafficking is concentrated.
Armed violence, organised criminality and
protracted civil wars are often a reflection of
economic activities which are not based on a
set of rules of law. In the context of intra-state
armed conflicts armed predatory acts and
extortion often turn into an independent
mode of production. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that the different violent actors in
their capacity as “homines oeconomici” are
sensitive to the costs of their tools of produc-
tion. Thus, prices charged in black market
transactions influence the actual demand and
hence the societal diffusion of small arms. If
the argument that the illegal circulation of
small arms is marked by price elasticity
holds, then massive market intervention
aiming at elevating prices would signifi-
cantly contribute to the reduction of illegal
circulation and societal diffusion of small
arms.
Black market intervention requires financial
resources and a trustworthy institution under
the authority of regional organisations like
the OAS or OAU and possibly national agen-
cies, in India2 for example. The ECOWAS
initiative is probably the politically most ad-
vanced agreement at the regional level to
control small arms. With strong financial and
institutional backing from the EU in the con-
text of the Lomé III agreement the feasibility
of aggressive black market intervention could
be tested in this region which is still infested
with large quantities of free-floating small
arms. Such a programme which is not re-
stricted to traditional buy-back schemes at
                                               
2 Tara Kartha’s ‘Tools of Terror; Light Weapons
and India’s Security’ (New Delhi 1999) de-
scribes in detail a scenario on the sub-continent
which clearly endorses an active market inter-
vention.
the end of civil wars is expected to tackle the
problem of illicit small arms availability by
pricing small arms and ammunition out of
reach to potential black market customers.
The implementation of such a scheme has to
take many hurdles. It is often argued that it is
not possible for an accountable agency to act
on the black market. It must be stressed,
however, that throughout the Cold War the
intelligence networks of major powers pur-
chased particularly small arms on the black
market, in order to avail themselves with
stocks of “deniability” to support their prox-
ies. The design of the agency is also a sensi-
tive issue, but given the damages caused by
the illegal diffusion of small arms the organ-
isational hurdles should not be insurmount-
able. Among others one can certainly borrow
from the experience in international co-
operation to combat the illicit trade of drugs.
While international programs for mine
clearing are widely accepted and receive con-
siderable support, the idea of a follow-up
initiative focusing on clearing illicit small
arms has not yet taken root. Like mine clear-
ing small arms “clearing” has important hu-
manitarian and economic dimensions. For
regions where protracted intra-state conflicts
have produced elaborate networks of black
market supplies specialising in small arms
and the complementary illegal channels for
the export of marketable products, like gems,
diamonds, tropical wood and diverted hu-
manitarian aid commodities are well en-
trenched, the availability of a Rapid Inter-
vention Fund (RIF) administered by the
United Nations would be helpful. Govern-
ments would be eligible to receive funds in
support of active intervention in the black
market and to take measures controlling the
illegal economy. The same would apply to
countries where an early warning of an
emerging conflict has been given.
But the supply of organised crime might also
be directly targeted in some cases. In south-
ern Africa the border towns in  Angola are
believed to operate huge black markets
where the organised crime in South Africa is
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believed to procure its weapons from stocks
spilling over from the protracted civil war. A
few million dollars invested in mopping up
the arms bazaars in the border region would
make a considerable contribution to con-
taining the sprawling violence in South Af-
rica (Chachiua 1999; Nkiwane et al. 1999). A
similar situation is reported from the border
region in Paraguay where the Brazilian and
Argentinian crime scenes procure their
weaponry (Gasparini Alves&Cipollone 1998).
The financial volumes required for such a
rapid intervention fund are modest if com-
pared with the costs of conflict and post-
conflict reconstruction. However, the rate of
return measured in added global economic
development should be high and therefore it
might be adequate to involve the Word Bank
in the provision of the required funds.
10. Reversing cultures of violence
Reducing the attractiveness of illegally pos-
sessing small arms is foremost a process of
reconstructing mutual confidence at the local
level. It calls for a consensus of putting the
state back into the driving seat along the road
towards improved security. The different
measures proposed to improve the control of
firearms and to reinforce the supply side
controls are only the start of an extensive po-
litical discourse over the mutual acceptance
of different identities needed before any legal
action can bear fruit. The ensuing discussions
about appropriate legal measures will al-
ready be part of the cultural and political
changes required to convert declaratory poli-
cies of governments into effective measures
of improved control and restraint among the
population. Bringing the diffusion of fire-
arms under control is not merely a legal act,
it requires to overcome the latent gun culture
whose “virus” is more firmly established in
some societies than in others. Unfortunately
the propagation of the gun culture is pres-
ently well entrenched in the global electronic
media. Some non-governmental organisa-
tions like the US-based National Rifle Asso-
ciation strategically sponsor the gun culture.
This “virus” does not recognise national bor-
ders and often operates as a precursor of the
global network of illicit arms trade. It has
been reported that the hero of the Rambo
movie is perceived as a role model among
young Africans in war-torn societies (Ri-
chards 1996).
The case for restrictions on advertisement for
small arms is one small element in a cam-
paign to neutralise gun cultures. The aggres-
sive visibility of advertisements for military
weapons in all kind of print media is but one
example of many accepted practices which
contradict the declared intention of many
governments to fight the diffusion of small
arms, including weaponry of military design.
Advertisements for military weapons3 in
print media are particularly suspect, since the
readers in most countries are legally not en-
titled to purchase the products advertised.
Since procurement officers are certainly not
appropriately addressed by scenic adver-
tisements praising the performance of auto-
matic guns and military ammunition in a
wide range of journals, it is pertinent to
question the purpose of such advertisements.
To secure contracts in the legitimate pro-
curement market sending extensive docu-
mentation, offering at competitive prices or
bribing the right person would seem much
more efficient and indeed practised strategies
to win contracts. So, what is the logic behind
the advertisements for sniper guns, auto-
matic weapons etc.? Is it merely to entice the
appetite of prospective customers, fanatics
who are addicted to weapons, so that they
would place their orders on the black market
which eventually translates indirectly into
higher demand in the legal market where the
advertising manufacturer has its stakes? Or is
it about cultivating a political climate where
the focus is on military solutions of political
                                               
3 For a detailed analysis of advertisements for
military weapons see: Peter Lock, Rüstung-
swerbung; Der Boom gegen die Krise der Rüs-
tungsindustrie. Militärpolitik Dokumentation
No.41/42, Frankfurt 1985.
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conflicts which guarantees business as usual
for the arms industry?
The fact that in general media aggressive
publicity for weapons which nobody is enti-
tled to possess, except for the armed forces
and law enforcement agencies, is tolerated
world-wide, is no longer acceptable. It ap-
pears to reflect a prevalence of a permissive
political climate with respect to the diffusion
of small arms. Just as advertisement for
medicine, smoking, and drinking came under
regulation in many countries, advertisement
for weaponry individuals are under no cir-
cumstances authorised to possess legally
should be restricted to the absolute minimum
required for rational procurement proce-
dures.
Displaying ammunition as if it were lipsticks
in the window of an up-market perfumery
attempts to impart ammunition with an es-
thetical aura and to obfuscate the inherently
dangerous character of the commodity.
Given the legal antecedents of restricting ad-
vertisements for certain other products, the
chances to challenge the public relations
practice of the international small arms in-
dustry look promising. The aim must be to
curb the indiscriminate propagation of fire-
arms at minimum of those legally restricted
to military use only. Earlier parliamentary
initiatives in the FRG4 to prohibit advertise-
ments for military weapons in general print
media should be reactivated and provide a
model for an initiative within the European
Union.
Children and minors around the world are
exposed to the products of the dominant
American entertainment industry. Armed
violence is a pivotal feature in these products
where product placing is a major element of
the business. Thus, firearm manufacturers
compete for placing their violent gadgets as
long and as often as possible in movies of all
                                               
4 In 1985 the Social Democratic Party proposed to
insert a paragraph into the Law to Control
Military Weaponry (Kriegswaffenkontrollge-
setz) banning the advertisement for military
weapons in general print media.
kind. The minimum regulation required
would be a code of conduct aiming at re-
ducing the open propagation of armed vio-
lence and a prohibition of product placing
related to small arms. This form of publicity
is particularly hideous, because the profit
motive of the movie producers requires as
many scenes as possible where posh guns
can be displayed, so that the respective
manufacturers pay a considerable fee.
11. Conclusion
The illegal proliferation and diffusion of
small arms are a case for sharing the respon-
sibility between industrialised and develop-
ing countries. They are structurally embed-
ded in the present stage of the global order.
The huge disposable quantities are a heritage
of the previous Cold War period, but the pull
factors are mainly of the making of the crude
imperfections of present economic order
(Lock 1999b). Most small arms and ammuni-
tion illegally circulating around the globe
were legally produced in industrialised
countries. At some stage these weapons were
separated from the chain of legal custody.
Straight theft is only a negligible source of
illicit availability. The transfer into illegal
ownership is either associated with a barter
deal or a cash transaction. In either case an
economic exchange between the regular
economy and criminal spheres is a precondi-
tion of effective flows. Thus, the recipient
party of the illegal trade must control some
economic activity linked to international
(global) markets which generates the indis-
pensable cash in a convertible currency or
allows for barter deals with low visibility. In
every case, therefore, the economics of the
black market for arms can be targeted from
the demand side through tightening the con-
trols of illegal economic transactions and tar-
geted economic embargoes. Only if the cur-
rent initiatives to curb the illicit trade of
small arms supplement their supply-side
strategies with regulatory measures barring
illegal commodities from entering the regular
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commodity market will these initiative
achieve the desired effect.
This is because on-going armed conflicts,
even in remote impoverished regions, are
never isolated events. To the contrary, their
dynamics and logistics depend on their con-
tinued participation in the global economy,
though often through the backdoor of crimi-
nal sectors. Without the oxygen of economic
interaction with the global economy armed
conflicts would suffocate or at least trans-
form into rather low levels of violence. This
message has not yet arrived at the centre
stage of the debate on small arms.
Tackling the small arms availability in on-
going wars requires an understanding of the
underlying economics (Keen 1998) which
would allow targeted and internationally co-
ordinated action to close the revenue gener-
ating backdoors of the global economy
through which criminal brokers organise lo-
gistical life lines for the fighting parties. More
generally, illicit small arms availability and
the growth of the global GCP (gross criminal
product) seem to be closely linked, not only
in cases of armed conflict as increasing levels
of armed violence in fragmented societies in
Latin America (Lock 1998a) and Africa (Lock
1999a) testify.
It must be repeated that the awareness of far-
reaching consequences of tolerating criminal
economic activities for the diffusion of armed
violence is still underdeveloped. From an
economic perspective all armed conflicts are
woven into the global economic web. In
some cases it might be necessary to sharpen
the legal instruments5, in order to stem the
arms supply of on-going wars. But there is no
denying that all armed conflicts are economi-
cally at our doorsteps and the spoils form
part of our consumption pattern which
makes them our common responsibility.
                                               
5 While some would argue that closing loopholes
is impossible, the crippling record of the Ameri-
can embargo against Cuba suggests that a lot
can be achieved provided the necessary political
will exists.
Approaching illicit small arms availability
from as many angles as possible contributes
to the creation of political awareness of this
complex situation which is required to mobi-
lise unilateral and multilateral measures de-
signed to reverse the fatal course of societal
militianisation. It is at the fringes of the pres-
ent order where the implosion of statehood
vis-à-vis a self-arming society is most visible,
but elements of this process are pervasive.
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